Operation Arnon: The heroic release of four Hamas hostages

June 24, 2024


The hostages kidnapped by Hamas – three men and one woman – were rescued alive in a joint rescue operation by the IDF, the security service Shin Bet and the Israeli police on June 8, 2024. In a daring daylight operation, this operation raided two different buildings in a Hamas-controlled area, amidst the civilian population, in the heart of the Gaza Strip.

The rescue operation, which took pladownloadce after weeks of careful planning, involved hundreds of fighters from the IDF, Shin Bet and Israel Police. It is known as Operation Arnon – in honor of Yamam (Special Police Forces) officer, Chief Inspector Arnon Zamora, who was wounded during the rescue of three male hostages and died an hour later in hospital. after his death the name of the operation was changed from “Seeds of Summer” to “Operation Arnon”. Between 100 and 274 Palestinians died during the rescue operation.

The “Fauda”-style commando attack is a small reprieve for Israel’s intelligence, military, police and security authorities, all of whom – along with politicians – made mistakes before, during and in connection with the 7/10 Hamas attack that led to catastrophic consequences.

Operation Arnon

Four hostages kidnapped by Hamas—Noa Argamani, Shlomi Ziv, Almog Meir Jan, and Andrey Kozlov—were rescued alive in a joint rescue operation by the IDF, the Shin Bet security service, and the Israel Police. Both Argamani (26) and Meir Jan (22) participated in the Nova festival, while Kozlov (27), a recent immigrant from Russia, and Ziv (41) had been festival guards.

Four released. Credit to the IDF

This daring daytime operation raided two apartment buildings in a Hamas-controlled area, in the middle of the civilian population, in the heart of the Gaza Strip.

More detailed information has now been obtained about this heroic operation, which describes how demanding the operation was.

Shin Bet and Yamam fighters arrived at the Nuseirat refugee camp in the Gaza Strip in undetected vehicles early in the morning. The fighters struck the hideout of the two building blocs, where the four hostages were being held. The fighters eliminated the armed guards and began their retreat after the camp awoke to the sounds of gunfire. Hundreds of Hamas terrorists emerged from their homes and started shooting at vehicles. The rescue team was supported by infantry, tank, air and naval units, which began a heavy artillery bombardment of the camp, under the cover of which the rescue team was able to retreat with the four living hostages.

Process

In all aspects, the operation can be considered heroic, as it involves numerous risks – a daily mission in the heart of a densely populated and terrorist-occupied refugee camp.

The base the operation is on information that starts with the location of the hostages. Once the information is received, its reliability is ensured by gathering additional information from other sources to increase the likelihood that they are accurate and relevant. This process alone can take days, if not weeks.

Information may be gathered through interrogation of captured prisoners, information on computers or documents seized during IDF operations in the Gaza Strip, Shin Bet intelligence officers and field agents of Military Intelligence Unit 504, and/or through signals intelligence (SIGINT). This can mean wiretapping phones and communication devices or tracking their location and usage patterns. Unit 8200 and other Shin Bet units use various SIGINT methods.

After this, the planning of the attack itself begins, including, for example, the mapping of access and withdrawal routes, methods for achieving the goal, and contingency plans for possible development scenarios of events. With planning, the terrain conditions, the roads, the apartments where the hostages were kept, and even the number of guards and placement at the target location, whatever is found out.

Various intelligence units participate in the program of the operational intelligence event. Intelligence is gathered using the means described above, including drones, and it is likely that this operation was preceded by field reconnaissance by covert units.

In real-time intelligence monitoring, the target determines a possible plan to prepare for changing needs.

Epilogue

A bold attack deep into a densely populated Palestinian civilian area shows the ability of Israeli special forces to cope with severe challenges, an excellent example of the cooperation of intelligence and security services with various military units and the police. The operation collectively boosted Israeli morale, bringing a moment of national pride and unity in the midst of war.

Succeeding in releasing the four hostages is a huge tactical victory, but does not change the overall strategic picture. In eight months so far, only seven hostages have been successfully rescued in three separate operations. 120 hostages still held by Hamas. According to various estimates, 61-66 of these are assumed to have died, and Hamas is estimated to have the bodies of 43 hostages.

Sources e.g: BICOM , INSS  and  Analysis | The Heroic Hostage Rescue Operation in the Heart of the Gaza Strip by Cmdr. (res.) Eyal Pinko in  IsraelDefense


The focus of the war in Gaza is shifting to Lebanon

June 14, 2024

“An Army needs to be large and smart; we are in the Middle East facing hundreds of millions of Arabs who want us dead. Just like that—dead.” (Offer Drori/IsraelDefense)

The war in Gaza has moved into a low-intensity phase where Israel carries out precision strikes against Hamas forces, searches for and destroys the initially more than 500 km tunnel network, and tries to return the remaining hostages alive or dead by armed means. At the current rate of progress, this final clean-up phase is estimated to last until the end of the current year. The alternative is for the ceasefire negotiations to proceed and the hostages to be released through it.

A significantly more acute situation is what is happening in the north on the border between Israel and Lebanon, where Hezbollah has supported Hamas since 7/10 terrorist attacks. My assessment is that Israel will start a limited ground offensive this coming weekend at the earliest, and yet that the goals of this limited new war in Lebanon will have been achieved by the end of August this year.

One of the reasons for the slow, step-by-step progress of the war in Gaza is that part of the IDF forces have been stationed north of the border with Lebanon in case of an escalation of the war – a possible large-scale attack by Hezbollah. In Gaza, the ground operations are focused on precision strikes and the most significant part of the troops has already withdrawn from there and some of the reservists have already been repatriated. The armed forces stationed in the north are now in full readiness to implement a security zone of about ten kilometres in southern Lebanon in order to stop the continuous rocket fire and missile attacks from there, so that more than 60,000 Israelis evacuated from northern Israel due to Hezbollah attacks could return to their homes by the time the school year starts (September 1) this year at the latest.

A brief history of the wars between Israel and Hezbollah -2006

Israel and Hezbollah have gone to war several times – most recently in 2006. The security situation in southern Lebanon deteriorated significantly at the end of the 1970s when Jordan expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the country. A large number of expelled Palestinians moved to Lebanon as refugees, continuing the hostilities against Israel from there. Armed confrontations between the PLO and Lebanese religious and ethnic groups led to the Lebanese Civil War, which began in April 1975 and lasted until 1990. In 1989, peace talks hosted by Saudi Arabia agreed on the division of power between the parties to the civil war in Lebanon. In 1990, Lebanese President Michael Aoun fled the country, officially ending the civil war. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) expelled the PLO from the country in 1991.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard founded Hezbollah in 1982 and waged a guerilla war until 2000, when a truce was signed. The governments of Israel and Lebanon recognized the UN’s presentation of the withdrawal line (blue line/BL) and committed to complying with it. However, neither country still recognizes the line of withdrawal as their official border. The number of UN UNIFIL troops in Lebanon was increased, the Lebanese government began to deploy LAF troops, police and other authorities in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL assisted and trained Lebanese security officials and continued to deliver humanitarian aid to the region. UNIFIL also initiated a tripartite negotiation and cooperation practice between UNIFIL, the IDF and the LAF.

Between 2001 and 2006, the UN constantly called on the Lebanese government to increase its presence in southern Lebanon. Despite numerous calls from the UN, the Lebanese government did not deploy LAF troops near the Blue Line (BL). In place of the Lebanese authorities, Hezbollah supervised BL, maintained law and order in the area, and organized social and health services and education for the citizens. Ceasefire violations on both sides of the BL were common.

Israel’s northern border 2006-

On July 16, 2006, Hezbollah unexpectedly started firing rockets into Israel in retaliation for Israel’s military actions in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Hezbollah fighters penetrated the Israeli side on BL and attacked an IDF patrol. Israel launched a ground attack on southern Lebanon on July 19, 2006, with the aim of driving Hezbollah’s forces north of the Litani River and destroying the organization’s ability to launch rockets into Israeli cities. Hezbollah put up a strong resistance and partially succeeded in stopping the IDF attack. On August 12, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701(2006). A UN-brokered ceasefire ended the fighting in South Lebanon by August 14, 2006.

The mission of the UNIFIL forces is, among other things, to support the grouping of the LAF in South Lebanon and BL and to assist it in creating a security zone in the area between the Litani River and BL, which is free of troops and weapons from other than the Lebanese government and UNIFIL, and to assist the Lebanese government in securing the country’s borders in order to stop unauthorized entry and weapons shipments.

UNIFIL has repeatedly failed in these tasks.

According to UN Resolution 1701(2006), the Lebanese government had to disarm all armed groups in southern Lebanon.[1] The disarmament of Vu and Hezbollah has not been realized. In fact, according to Israel, Hezbollah has even more rockets and missiles in the region than at the beginning of the 2006 war, and the organization is the real power holder in southern Lebanon.

The northern border has been constantly restless and, for example, with the help of Operation Northern Shield, implemented at the turn of the year 2018/19, the IDF detected and destroyed six Hezbollah attack tunnels leading from Lebanon to Israel. The purpose of the tunnels was to allow hundreds of elite Hezbollah soldiers to infiltrate northern Israel in accordance with the military doctrine “Conquest of Galilee” formed after 2006 in the hope of capturing some strategically important areas of northern Israel under the cover of a massive missile attack. (More, for example, in my article Operation Northern Shield)

Arming Hezbollah

Since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah, with Iran’s help, has advanced both in quantity and quality of weaponry to the extent that it has become the biggest conventional threat to Israel in recent years.

Hezbollah’s arsenal is estimated to be more than 150,000 missiles and rockets, which is almost ten times the number of weapons that Hamas and Palestinian Jihad had before October 7, 2023. Part of the arsenal includes cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, as well as precision missiles with impressive accuracy at both short and long ranges. This is complemented by attack and reconnaissance drones and air defense systems.

Israel has since been on 7/10 high alert due to the growing threat to its northern border. Israel’s air defense layers include the Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems against short- and medium-range missiles, and the Arrow 2 and 3 systems against long-range ballistic missiles. To Israel in May at record speed Shot UAVs and drones can be intercepted by anti-aircraft missiles, the Iron Dome system or high-speed artillery and in the future by powerful lasers. However, no system is perfect or sufficient in capacity for mass attacks, and so, for example, on June 5, 2024, an IDF reservist was killed and at least ten people were wounded in a drone attack on the Druze village of Hurfeish in the Upper Galilee.

The IDF is investigating how two such drones were able to penetrate Israeli airspace undetected without triggering defense systems or warning sirens. Flying the drones at low altitudes helps prevent their detection, but it was still expected that the IDF had learned from such tactics, which Hezbollah used almost daily in several attacks on northern Israel over the past eight months. Attacks from Lebanon appear to be increasing, with Shin Bet recording over 1,000 attacks (rockets, anti-tank missiles, drones) in May. In comparison, they recorded 334 attacks in January and 534 in February, while more than 740 were recorded in March and April.

Israel’s Tuesday [11.6.24] airstrike in Lebanon succeeded in eliminating the highest-ranking Hezbollah commander in the current war, Abu Taleb. In total, more than 300 Hezbollah fighters have now died in the war, and at the same time around 80 civilians have died. 18 Israeli soldiers and 10 civilians have died. More than 60,000 Israeli civilians are still evacuated from the border area against Lebanon.

On Thursday [6/13/24], Hezbollah launched one of its largest rocket/missile attacks on Israel, claiming to have launched more than a hundred rockets. According to Israel, about 40 arrived in Israeli airspace, there was no comment on the destruction. This in part makes the Israelis nervous and it remains to be seen whether an airstrike is a sufficient response or whether it is time for a ground attack.

Epilogue

“It must be understood that what separates Jewish existence in the Land of Israel from a Giant Slaughterhouse is the IDF.” (Offer Drori/IsraelDefense)

Of the parts of the Iranian-backed blockade surrounding Israel – Gaza/Hamas, West Bank, Lebanon/Hezbollah, Syria/Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Iraq, Yemen/Houthis – Hezbollah is Iran’s strongest proxy army. A full-scale war against Hezbollah would be devastating for Israel’s civilian population and community structure, even if there was no doubt about the winner. Mutual deterrence will prevent it from occurring and the situation will calm down to the level that prevailed before 7/10 after the safety zone is restored; the risks of a larger escalation for all parties are too great.

Sources include INSS, INSS, BICOM